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1. Introduction 
For a long period of time perfect information has been a standard 
assumption in economic theory. Particularly in neoclassical mic-
ro-economic theory individuals by assumption know all prices and 
all characteristics of goods. Information about changes in the 
economic system is transferred immediately to al 1 individuals, 
thus provocing instantaneous reactions, which stabi 1 ize the sy-
stem and bring it to equilibrium. This implies that all informa-
tion is completely costless, not only in monetary terms, but also 
in terms of time and effort necessary to aquire it. If he had to 
spend money or time to gather information, the neoclassical homo-
oeconomicus would optimize the amount of resources invested into 
accumulation of information with respect to other activities. 
Consequent 1 y, to stay cons is tent within the neoc 1 ass ica 1 frame-
work, information has to emerge somehow from within the indivi-
dua 1 and it has to do so in no time. 
"That human endavors are constrained by our limited and uncertain 
knowledge of the world has always been recognized by leading 
economic thinkers. ( ... ) But despite this long standing recogni-
tion, until relatively recently there was no rigorous foundation 
for the analysis of individual decision-making and market equili-
brium under uncertainty" (Hirshleifer and Riley 1979, p.1375). 
Fol lowing the work of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), some 
important steps were undertaken by the theory of liquidity prefe-
rence (Tobin 1958), portfolio (Markowitz 1959), and state pre-
ference theory (Hirshleifer 1966). 
In labor market theory the strict information assumption of stan-
dard neoclassical theory was fist weakened by the invention of 
job search models (Stigler, 1961, 1962). Workers no longer are 
assumed to know "the wage" exactly, but to face a distribution of 
wages in the market. They draw from this distribution and since 
there are cost involved with each draw the individual faces a 
stopping problem. After each draw he has to decide whether to 
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accept the offer drawn or to continue searching. To do so, in 
each step the individual has to compare the actual wage offer 
with the uncertain outcome of the continued search sequence net 
of search cost. 
Numerous versions of the search model have been developed. They 
can be classified by criteria like limited or unlimited search, 
recal 1 or no recall, the number of wage offers per period, etc. 
The most fundamental classification criterion is the assumption 
concerning the individual's knowledge about the wage offer dis-
tribution; whether he knows the distribution exactly or not. If 
he does, draws from the distribution do not tell the individual 
anything new about parameters and form of the distribution, while 
in the second case with each draw the individual improves his 
knowledge about the distribution. The following discussion about 
the regional implications of job-search models will be organized 
along this distinction. 
Although the concept of search is well accepted in migration 
literature (see e.g. Clark 1983, Greenwood 1985), little emphasis 
has been put into the formal linking of migration and job search 
models (Schaeffer 1985). With a few exceptions (Weibull 1978, 
David 1974, Miron 1978, Rogerson 1982) the literature either uses 
just a verbal job search argumentation without strict formal 
considerations or departs considerably from the basic structure 
of economic job search models, focusing e.g. on the problem of 
matching applicants and vacancies in the labor market. 
By no means it is our intention to disregard the importance of 
this body of literature. In some aspects it is more realistic 
than pure job search concepts and able to overcome some of the 
weaknesses of search models, particularly in relating labor 
supply and demand. Nevertheless, this situation is surprising 
from a theoretical as well as an empirical point of view, since 
there is a huge and fast growing literature on search processes 
in economics (see e.g. Rosenfield and Shapiro 1981, Burdett and 
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Malueg 1981, Benhabib and Bull 1983, Morgan 1985, Morgan and 
Manning 1985), and in regional science a lively interest in the 
analysis of individual decisions and most recently in the dyna-
mics of individual decisions (Dunn and Wrigley 1985, Davies and 
Pickles 1985). Lerman and Mahmassani (1985) made an attempt to 
link search and discrete choice models and provided a framework 
for econometric estimation of search processes. 
It is the aim of this paper to analyse the implications economic 
job search models have for migration. We restrict ourselves to 
the job search model predominant in the economic literature and 
its variants. Therefore we use the following assumptions through-
out the paper, which are more or less standard in job search 
theory. 
The wage offer distribution is constant over time. So the 
individual always faces the same wage offer distribution 
while searching for a job. 
The individual is risk neutral and income is the only ele-
ment in his utility function. Therefore the expected utility 
of scme uncertain income is equal to the utility of the 
expected income and the individual's utility function can be 
ignored. 
Labor and jobs are homogenous within the submarket of the 
individual. With the exception of the wage there are no 
differences between jobs. They all offer the same working 
conditions and there is no risk of losing the job in the 
future. The productivity of all workers is the same. 
Search cost are known to the individual. 
When more than one (regional) labor market has to be taken into 
account, we use two additional basic assumptions: 
Labor markets are disjoint and the assumptions mentioned 
above hold for a 11 of them. 
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Migration cost are known to the individual. 
The paper generalizes some earlier work done by the author (Maier 
1983, 1985a). So the models and results presented there wil 1 be 
discussed here only briefly. 
2. Job-search models with perfect information about the wage 
offer distribution 
2.1. The standard job search model 
Additional to the assumptions mentioned above the standard ver-
sion of the job-search model assumes unlimited search. Additio-
nally let us assume in the first step that the individual can 
draw one wage offer per time period and that he doesn't discount 
opportunities. With this set of assumptions the individual's 
optimal strategy is myopic and has the reservation wage property 
(Lippman and McCall, 1976). He fixes a reservation wage and 
searches for the first wage offer to exceed it (Telser, 1973, 
Lippman, McCall, 1976, 1979, McCall, 1970). Let c be the cost for 
one random draw from the wage offer distributionr x a random 
variable denoting wage offers, and F(x) the cumulative density 
function of this random variable then the reservation wage (y*) 
has to satisfy the following condition: 
00 
C = f (x-y*) dF(x) 
y* 
( 1) 
Since in each step the individual compares the actual wage offer 
with the expected return of continued unlimited search and 
chooses the larger one, the reservation wage is constant over 
time and equal to the expected return of search with search cost 
c, wage offer distribution F and an unlimited search horizon. Let 
us denote this expected return of search as V, leaving the depen-
dence on c, F, and the search horizon implicit. 
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00 
V = y* = -c + f max(x,y*) dF(x) 
0 
( 2) 
This strategy maximizes the individual's expected return of 
search. Deviations yield a lower expected return of search. They 
either lead to the acceptance of too low wage offers or to a 
search sequence longer and thus more expensive than optimal. All 
these results hold for both, the recal 1 and no-recal 1 strategy. 
This follows from the fact that the reservation wage doesn't 
change over time. Therefore the first offer exceeding the reser-
vation wage is always the largest one in the whole sequence and 
will be chosen irrespective of the validity of recall. 
This search model has the following well known properties: 
An increase in search cost leads to a decline in the reser-
vation wage (= expected return of search) and therefore to a 
shorter expected period of search. 
A mean preserving increase in the riskiness of the wage 
offer distribution yields a higher reservation wage. 
Lippman and McCal 1 (1976) discuss some interesting variants of 
the standard search model. They all imply optimal search strate-
gies with the general structure and results discusses above. They 
are myopic, and have a reservation wage, which is invariant over 
time. However, the reservation wages differ from (1) or (2). 
Discounting yields a lower reservation wage, which is lower for 
greater interest rates. Equation (2) becomes 
00 
y* = ( 1+r) - 1 (-c+fmax (x,y*) dF (x)) 
0 
( 3) 
when the search cost is incurred at the end of the time period, 
and 
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00 
Y* -1 = -c + (1+r) Jmax(x,y*) dF(x) 
0 
( 4) 
when it is incurred at the beginning of the period. In both cases 
the wage offer is assumed to be received at the end of the 
period. 
If the individua 1 cannot draw one wage offer per period of time 
with certainty but only with some probability p, the reservation 
wage will be lower for lower probabilities. It results from 
which 
their 
lable 
search 
of the 
is a 
work 
00 
y* = p (-c + Jmax(x,y*)dF(x)) 
0 
general version of ( 2). An other 
is the f o 11 owing: Search with a 
( 5) 
interesting result of 
fixed number of avai-
wage offers per period yields a higher expected return than 
with a random number of wage offers with an expeced number 
same size. 
This whole family of the job search models implies a very simple 
optimal migration behavior. For the discussion of these implica-
tions we will utilize the most simple version of the job search 
model as described by (1) and (2). Suppose there are N regions, 
each characterized by its own wage offer distribution and search 
cost. 
F.(x), c. 
l l 
i = 1, .. ,N 
Assume further that the assumptions of the standard search model 
hold for al 1 N regions and that the migration cost (m) between 
the regions are known to the individual and satisfy 
mij { =O 
>O 
for i=j 
for i#j 
( 6) 
With known wage offer distributions and search cost the indivi-
6 
dual can calculate reservation wages for all regions from (1) or 
(2). Let's denote them as 
{ 7) 
As noted above, they are equa 1 to the expected return of search 
in these regions. Without loss of generality we can assume that 
the individual is currently located in region 1. Then the indivi-
dual can calculate his expected return from migration to region j 
(Y* ) as 
1 j 
* Y - y*. - m 1j - J 1j ( 8) 
and choose the region giving the highest expected return net of 
search cost. 
It is important to note that the migration decision based on (8) 
is not stochastic. Because of his perfect knowledge of the wage 
offer distribution the individual can calculate the expected 
returns for all regions exactly. His actual income in the chosen 
region, however, is a random variable. 
This migration model has some interesting features: 
By assumption the individual knows al 1 cost and all wage 
offer distributions. There is no strategy which can provide 
any additional information. If we make the reasonable as-
sumption that search in a region is always more expensive 
when the individual does not live in this region, the indi-
vidual will always migrate before he starts searching for a 
job (Maier 1986). 
Since the reservation wage doesn't change over time the 
expected returns from migration do not change either. There-
fore the individual chooses the optimal region and will 
never have to revise this choice during the search process. 
Each individual will search for a job in only one region. 
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Migration cost are the only element varying with distance. 
Therefore all the distance-sensibility of migration rates, 
which is observed in reality, has to be ascribed to this 
variable. In this respect nothing is gained from a job 
search approach as compared to the simple "full information" 
- model. 
The properties of the search model noted above lead directly 
to the conclusion that a region is more preferable when -
other things equal - it has lower search cost or a more 
risky wage offer distribution. The second point is of parti-
cular importance. It implies that not only the mean but also 
higher moments of the wage offer distribution will influence 
migration behavior. 
2.2. A job search model with limited search horizon 
One reason for the simplicity of the migration model lies in the 
fact that we have assumed an unlimited search horizon. This 
assumption leads directly to the result of a time-invariant 
reservation wage. For the rest of this section we will discuss 
the changes in the search- and migration model following from a 
relaxation of this assumption. 
Let us assume a search model differing from the standard version 
only in the respect that the individual faces a limited search 
sequence of n additional draws. Under this assumption the reser-
vation wage does not remain constant over time and consequently 
the recall and no-recall options yield different results. In the 
economic job search literature it is usually argued that the 
limitation of the search sequence is the result of the life 
expectancy of the individual and/or his wealth, both of which 
diminish during the search process. In this interpretation n, the 
number of additional draws open to the individual, is a characte-
8 
ristic of the individual only and is unrelated to the (regional) 
labor market he searches. We will first discuss the model and its 
implications for migration and in section 2.3 reinterpret it in a 
more space-related way. Moreover, we will discuss the no-recall 
option on 1 y. 
The expected return of search in a search model of this type 
(perfect knowledge about F, no recall, n additional draws permit-
ted) is equa 1 to 
co 
n-1 
= -c + Jmax(V ,x) dF(x} ( 9) 
0 
where the superscripts (n) and {n-1) indicate the length of the 
remaining search sequence. By assumption 
and therefore 
V 1 = 
v 0 = 0 
-c + 
00 
fx dF(x) 
0 
( 10) 
So, when the individual is down to one additional draw, the only 
thing he can do is to pay the search cost and accept whatever he 
draws from the wage offer distribution. 
As can be shown by a simple induction argument (Lippman and 
McCall 1976) the expected return of search is a nondecreasing 
function of n, with 
lim vn = y* 
n-+oo 
( 11) 
Or, if viewed the other way around, when an individual starts 
with a long search horizon (large n) his reservation wage is only 
little below that of an unlimited search sequence. With each 
unacceptable draw the individual becomes less selective, i.e. his 
reservation wage decreases. It does so with increasing steps. In 
9 
the last step (n = 1) the individual will be willing to accept 
every wage offer that comes up. Loosely speaking, more and more 
emphasis is shifted from the upper part of the wage offer distri-
bution, which is determining the reservation wage of the unlimi-
ted search sequence, to the distribution as a whole. 
The range of the possible values for Vnis determined by the 
spread of the wage offer distribution and search cost. The first 
influence results from the reaction of (2} to a mean preserving 
increase in the spread of the wage offer distrubition. The second 
one sterns from the fact that 
ay*/ac = 1/(F(y*)-1) and av 1;ac = -1 ( 12) 
the marginal changes of (2} and (10) to changes in search cost. 
Note that the range between (10) and (2) decreases with increa-
sing search cost and that it is zero for F(Y*) = 0, i.e. for 
search cost equal to the mean of the wage offer distributon, a 
value which makes the individual indifferent between search and 
·no-search and reduces (2) and (9) to zero. 
Let us turn to the migration behavior implied by this search 
model. Since the expected return of search for an individual 
varies over time, equation (8) changes to 
( 13) 
with '11 being the expected return of search in region j, given a 
search horizon of n. Still the individual chooses the region 
offering the highest expected return net of search cost, however, 
he has to make this decision for every value of n. 
This has an important effect on the migration decision: 
In this model it can be an optimal strategy for the indivi-
dual to start to search in one region and, if unsuccessful, 
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to move to an other region. Because of the properties of the 
search mode 1, as 1 ong as n decreases this move a 1 ways has to 
be to a region with a less risky wage offer distribution 
with a higher mean. A move in the contrary direction will 
only be made by an individual, whose parameter n did in-
crease, e.g. because of the accumulation of wealth. 
If we assume n mainly to be determined by the age of the indivi-
dual, this result implies that older people tend to prefer re-
gions with less risky wage offer distributions. However, a re-
gion, which has a wage offer distribution with lower risk and 
1 ower mean than any other wi 11 not be chosen at a 11. 
2.3. A spatial job search model 
Up to now we have considered spatial aspects only at the level of 
the migration model. At the level of the job search model we have 
applied the concept of a spaceless point economy. The size of the 
regional labor market was assumed to be given exogenously. This 
structure is by no means realistic, and so we will turn to the 
discussion of a spatial version of the standard job search model, 
i.e. the model with perfect knowledge about the wage offer 
distribution. As it wil 1 turn out, the limitation of the search 
sequence is an implicit result of this model. 
Suppose the individual is located at one point in space, labeled 
1) and enterprises distributed somehow around this point at 
discrete locations. So, in an area with a specific radius around 
his location the individual finds a limited number of enterpri-
ses. Let's assume that all enterprises in this area apply the 
same wage offer distribution F(x) and that search cost for the 
individual increase with the distance from point 1. 
The relation between search cost and distance can be interpreted 
in one of two ways: (1) as the influence of distance on the 
search cost per se; i.e. the effect of the longer way to obtain a 
11 
wage offer, (2) as the influence mentioned in (1) ;,lus the pre-
sent value of commuting cost. The first case will establish only 
a weak relation between search cost and distance, while in the 
second case the individual's location within the labor market 
region has to be assumed fixed at point 1. For the sake of 
simplicity we will accept the second interpretation. 
However, both versions allow the individual to label the enter-
prises in increasing order of search cost. We will use the index 
k for this sequence of firms. If the search cost increase strong-
ly enough, there is a label K, for which 
C >= k 
00 
f x dF (x) 
0 
( 14) 
From this point on the expected return of a single draw from the 
wage offer distribution is zero or negative and so, the indivi-
dual will never search beyond K, which on the one hand represents 
the cut off point in the sequence of firms, on the other the 
spatial boundary of the individual's reg ion al 1 abor market. So 
the individual faces a search problem with at most K firms to 
search. 
As proved in the appendix it is optimal to search firms with 
lower search cost first. So, without any further assumptions the 
optimal strategy would be to search the firm with lowest search 
cost only. Since this is exactly the unlimited search problem 
discussed above, we will add the assumption that each firm can be 
searched on 1 y once. This assumption seems to be quite technica 1 
in this form. However, it can be modified either to hold only for 
a specific time period or that each firm can be searched a limi-
ted number of times. 
With this extra assumption the individual's optimal strategy is 
to search the firms in increasing order of search cost. There-
fore, the expected return of search at firm k is (note that k 
increases during search, while n in section 2.2 decreases) 
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-c + k 
co 
k+1 Jmax(x,V ) dF(x) 
0 
for k<K ( 15) 
It decreases with increasing k because of (1) the increasing 
search cost and (2) the decreasing number of available opportuni-
ties. The two influences are connected, since the maximum search 
distance, as determined by (14), is a function of search cost. 
In this version of the search model the spatial structure of the 
region plays a central role. Regions with firms concentrated 
around the location of the individual have a higher expected 
return of search than regions with a more disperse distribution 
of firms. The reason is that in the first case the individual 
will have many more chances for observing an acceptable wage 
offer at low cost than in the second. When al 1 firms are lined up 
at the maximum search distance, the expected return of search is 
zero. 
Table 1. The effect of Bon the expected Return of search 
B V B V 
0.1 1.972 1.0 7.818 
0. 2 3.452 2.0 8.708 
0.3 4.572 3. 0 8.905 
0.4 5.430 4. 0 8.963 
0.5 6.092 5.0 8.983 
0. 6 6.610 6.0 8.991 
0.7 7.018 7.0 8.995 
0.8 7.343 8.0 8.997 
0.9 7.605 9. 0 8.998 
Table 1 illustrates this feature by the use of a simple numerical 
example. We use a uniform wage offer distribution between zero 
and ten and a linear relation between search cost and distance. 
F(x) = x/1O 0<=x<=10 ck= 0.05 + 0.05 dk 
With this specification the maximum search distance is 99 and we 
fix the number of firms at 99 as wel 1. The different values for 
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the expected return of search in table 1 originate from the 
variation of a single parameter B relating the index k to dis-
tance and thus describing the spatial distribution of firms in 
the region. 
When compared to the model with limited search sequence discussed 
in section 2.2, the effect of the spatial distribution of oppor-
tunities is much stronger than that of the number of firms. This 
results from the fact that in the present model search cost 
increase with each draw. A major difference between the model 
with limited search sequence and the spatial model lies in the 
nature of the limitation. While Nin the first model is a charac-
teristic of the individual, Kin the second is a characteristic 
of the reg ion. So, when the indi v idua 1 migrates from one reg ion 
to another, in the spatial model he can start the new search 
sequence from the beginning, i.e. from k = 1. This is not the 
case in the model with limited search sequence. Moreover, since 
search cost increase during the search sequence, the reaction of 
the expected return of search through time is stronger than in 
the model with limited search sequence. 
Al 1 these have important effects on the level of the migration 
model. All other things equal regions are more preferable when 
they have a more risky wage offer distribution, 
a lower general level of search cost, 
there are more firms within the maximum search distance, 
they have a more concentrated spatial distribution of firms. 
Since K is a characteristic of the region, search in one region 
does not reduce the expected return of search in other regions. 
So the result derived from the search model with limited search 
sequence that migration is directed towards regions with a less 
risky wage offer distribution does not hold in the spatial model. 
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On the other hand, the result of the standard search model that 
migration always occurs ahead of any search activity does not 
hold either. Since the expected return of search decreases with 
each unsuccessful draw, at each step the individual has to make a 
migration decision. If there is a region offering a higher expec-
ted return of search - net of migration cost - than his current 
one, the individual should migrate to this region. Because of the 
increasing search cost migration is more likely in this model 
than in the models discussed before. 
3 . Search models with imperfect information about the wage 
offer distribution 
Until now we used the assumption that the individual has full 
knowledge about the wage offer distribution. It is not much 
weaker than the perfect information assumption of standard neo-
classical theory. Only if information about the wage offer dis-
tribution is completely costless, an optimising individual would 
acquire full knowledge about the wage offer distribution, other-
wise he would try to balance the cost of additional information 
with its marginal value, which again depends on the subject the 
information is used for. 
~ search model based on the assumption of full knowledge about 
the wage offer distribution completely ignores the process of 
learning and implies a rather neurotic behavior of the indivi-
dual: he does not change his opinion about the wage offer distri-
bution, even if he observes the lowest wage offer possible one 
hundred times in a row. 
The reason for the popularity of this assumption lies in the fact 
that it simplifies the model structure and yields an optimal 
search strategy which has the reservation wage property. With 
this property at each step the set of possible wage offers can be 
split into two convex subsets, the acceptable and the not-accep-
15 
table wage offers, divided by the reservation wage. All wages 
larger - or equal - than the reservation wage are acceptable, all 
other unacceptable. 
When assuming the individual has only incomplete knowledge of the 
wage offer distribution ttthe problem becomes more complex, and 
search strategies become less well behaved" (Rosenfield and Sha-
piro 1981, p.1). In this type of model wage offers are not only 
employment opportunities, they also provide information about the 
wage offer distribution. Besides deciding whether to accept the 
wage offer or not the individual has to incorporate this new 
information into his state of knowledge. We assume that this is 
done according to Bayes' rule. Because of this updating process 
models of this type do not generally have the reservation wage 
property. Consider for example the following situation (adapted 
from Rothschild 1974, p.701): ttSuppose there are three wages, 
$1.00, S2.00, and $3.00, and that the cost of search is $0.01. 
Prior beliefs admit the possibility of only two distributions of 
wages. Either all wages are $1.00 or they are distributed between 
$2.00 and $3.00 in the proportions 1 to 99. A man with these 
beliefs should accept a wage of $1.00 (as this is a signal that 
no higher wages are to be had) and reject a quote of S $2.00 
(which indicates that the likelihood is high that a much better 
wage will be obtained on another draw).tt (Lippman and McCall 
1976, p.174). Obviously there is no reservation wage in this 
situation. What makes this example work, of course, is the fact 
that the wage offer contains a large amount of information, since 
it allows the individual to distinguish between the two possible 
distributions. 
For more reasonable situations, however, one can prove that the 
search problem has the reservation wage property. For a multino-
minal distribution of wage offers with a dirichlet prior this 
prove was worked out by Rothschild (1974). Rosenfield and Shapiro 
(1981) provide a general theorem for the existence of the reser-
vation wage property and show that a normal wage offer distribu-
16 
tion with unknown mean and an exponential wage offer distribution 
with exponential prior on the parameter 
tions of the theorem. 
both fulfill the condi-
Let F(x) be the subjective distribution of wage offers describing 
the individual's knowledge prior to any search. It is the result 
of information received from friends and relatives of general 
information transmitted by mass media etc. In addition to the 
wage offers observed up to a specific point in the search se-
quence this distribution describes the individual's state of 
knowledge. Let p be the vector of past wage offers and F(xlp) the 
individual's subjective distribution of wage offers after obser-
ving the vector p. V(p) denotes the expected return of search, 
which now is a function of the vector of past offers. 
In a search problem without recall and limited ton more draws 
the expected return of search is 
00 
n-1 I = -c + Jmax{x,V (x,p)} dF(x p) 
0 
( 16) 
If the reservation wage property holds the reservation wage 
results from solving for x 
n-1 
X = V (x,p) ( 1 7) 
and is a function of n and p. 
As in section 2 the expected return of search is a nonde-
creasing function of n. This results from the fact that an 
increase of n only adds additional options without changing 
the cost of search. 
The expected return of future search - the right hand side 
of (17) - depends on the value of the wage offer drawn, 
since this influences the individual's beliefs about the 
actual wage offer distribution. 
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It is a non-decreasing function of x, and in the limiting 
case of full knowledge about the distribution and unlimited 
search it is constant. 
Since additional information contributes relatively more 
when the individual has only little knowledge the slope of 
the right hand side of (17) with respect to x is larger in 
this case. 
The strategy discussed in section 2 was optima 1 in the sense that 
it yielded the highest expected return of search. It was based on 
the assumption of perfect knowledge about the wage offer distri-
bution. The best strategy an individual with incomplete knowledge 
about the wage offer distribution can apply will deviate from 
this sequence of reservation wages, and therefore result in a 
lower expected return of search. Since deviations from the opti-
mal full knowledge strategy are more likely when the individual 
has less precise information, the expected return of search 
increases - other things equal - with the precision of informa-
tion and converges towards the return of full knowledge search. 
The question arises how the reservation wage changes over time in 
a search prob 1 em with incomp 1 ete know 1 edge and the reservation 
wage property. There are three counteracting influences: 
The limitation of the search problem as indicated by the 
index n in (16) leads to a decrease in the reservation wage 
during search. 
The improvement in knowledge about the distribution the 
individual experiences during search increases the reserva-
tion wage. 
For search to continue to a specific point, all wage offers 
observed up to this point have to be unacceptable. So the 
individual gets more and more information about unacceptable 
wage offers, but no additional hints that there are any 
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acceptable wage offers. At least in the long run this has to 
reduce the reservation wage. 
The net effect of these three influences is unclear. Neither the 
relevant literature gives any clear results nor were we able to 
prove an increasing or decreasing reservation wage. Numerical 
tests, however, using a multinomial wage offer distribution al-
ways produced a sequence of decreasing reservation wages. Also 
intuitively this is the most appealing tendency. 
~ith imperfect knowledge about the wage offer distribution accu-
mulation of information is valuable for the individual. Its 
expected result is an increase in the individual's expected 
return of search by reducing the probability of large deviations 
from the full knowledge sequence of reservation wages. The main 
difference between search and the accumulation of information 
lies in the fact that observation of wage offers above the reser-
vation wage stop the search strategy but do not stop the informa-
tion strategy. Since with more and more accumulated knowledge the 
expected return of search converges towards the full knowledge 
value, the expected value of additional information decreases and 
converges towards zero. So, for an individual whose prior know-
ledge is vague but indicates the possibility of high wage offers 
the accumulation of additional information very likely is opti-
mal. 
In a migration context the assumption of imperfect knowledge 
about the wage offer distribution has some important implica-
tions: 
Migration cost is not any longer the only distance related 
element. The individual will also have less precise prior 
information about the wage offer distribution in more dis-
tant regions and information cost will be higher for those 
regions as we 11. 
General (newspapers, radio, TV, etc.) and individual speci-
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fie information channels {friends, relatives, business con-
tacts, etc.) have an important impact on migration behavior. 
They can improve the prior knowledge about the wage offer 
distribution in a specific region and also lower the infor-
mation cost. Past migrants can have a similar influence and 
thus establish a beaten path phenomenon (see Maier 1985a for 
a discussion of more effects of this type). 
The migration decision depends on the prior knowledge an 
individual has about the wage offer distribution in a speci-
fic region. Therefore, from the point of view of the analyst 
the migration decision no longer is deterministic (as in 
section 2) but stochastic. This is very similar to the 
randomness of the utility in discrete choice models (see 
Hensher and Johnson 1981, Ben Akiva and Lerman 1985, Maier 
1985b). 
4. Summary and concluding remarks 
The discussion of regional impacts of job search models was 
organized along the knowledge an individual is assumed to have 
about the wage offer distribution. Section 2 discusses job search 
models with perfect knowledge about the wage offer distribution 
and their implications for migration. Section 3 focuses on the 
more comp 1 icated but more rea 1 is tic mode 1 with imperfect know-
ledge about the distribution. 
In particular the standard job search model (with unlimited 
search horizon, section 2.1) was found to bring forth quite 
unsatisfactory results at the migration level. It implies that 
migration decisions are always made ahead of any search and the 
individual will search one region only. When turning to the job 
search model with limited search horizon (section 2.2) we found 
these results not to hold any longer. In this model unsuccessful 
search can be followed by migration, although it is rather un-
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likely since the limitation of the search horizon is determined 
by the characteristics of the individual, not by those of the 
region. In section 2.3 we discuss a spatial version of the stan-
dard job search model where search cost are a function of the 
distance between the locations of the individual and the firm. In 
this model the search sequence is implicitly limited by the 
maximum search distance, and firms are searched in increasing 
order of search cost. The spatial distribution of firms has an 
important impact on the expected return of search and consequent-
ly on the attractivity of regions at the migration level. A 
disperse spatial distribution of firms yields a much lower expec-
ted return of search than a spatial concentration of firms. 
In section 3 we discuss search models with imperfect knowledge 
about the wage offer distribution. Offers drawn provide additio-
nal information about the wage offer distribution, which the 
individual incorporates into his state of knowledge. This model 
is more complicated than the model versions discussed in section 
2 and does not always have the reservation wage property. For 
some reasonable assumptions about the wage offer distribution and 
the individual's state of knowledge, however, the reservation 
wage property can be shown to hold. Since less precise informa-
tion about the wage offer distribution yields a lower reservation 
wage, in this model information and the way it is distributed 
over space have an important impact on migration. Friends and 
relatives, past migrants, mass media, etc. can lead to a situa-
tion where individuals have better knowledge about the wage offer 
distribution in a specific region and will therefore more likely 
migrate to this region. 
It was the aim of this paper to investigate the regional implica-
tions of job search models. Although there are numerous versions 
of search models in economic literature, the assumptions made in 
section 1 are more or less common to all of them. When trying to 
evaluate the role job search models can play in regional theory, 
one has to be aware of the restrictive nature of these assump-
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tions. Especially the neglect of all effects unsuccessful search 
and unemployment have on the behavior of the individual and on 
the wage offer distribution he faces is a severe weakness. It is 
related to the fact that employers are usually treated only as 
"random number generators" in job search models. They produce 
wage offers according to a specific probability function and are 
by no means interested in filling their vacancies or hiring the 
most productive applicant. So, job search models deal with just 
one side of the labor market and do not adequately represent the 
adjustment processes in the labor market. All attempts to over-
come this deficit were successful only for very simplistic search 
models (see e.g. MacMinn, 1980). 
Nevertheless, the concept of search is appealing and clearly 
superior to the old neoclassical ful 1 information approach. It 
seems to b2 a step in the right direction, although the goal of a 
consistent microeconomic theory based on limited information is 
still way ahead; not to mention a spatial theory of this type. 
From our point of view future efforts should be made in the 
following areas: In theory more attention should be paid to 
search models with imperfect knowledge about the wage offer 
distribution. Particularly from a regional point of view they 
seem much more promising than perfect knowledge search models. 
Secondly, the integration of supply and demand to search-based 
labor market models is urgently needed. In empirical research, on 
the other hand, more effort should be made in investigating the 
reality of search processes and testing the hypotheses brought 
about by various theoretical models. The recent interest of 
regiona 1 scientists, geographers and economists in the ana 1 ysis 
of microdata and the rapid methodological progress in this area 
(see e.g. Wrigley 1985, Ben Akiva and Lerman 1985) should ease 
this task. 
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Appendix 
Suppose there are two possible draws labeled k and 1 out of a 
search sequence of some length greater than both k and 1. These 
two draws are characterized by search cost ck and c
1
. 
The expected return of search from k and 1 onwards is independent 
of the sequence in which k and 1 are searched and is denoted by 
denotes the return of search where first k is searched 
and then 1, V denotes the return of the reverse sequence. V 
lk k 
is the expected return where 1 has already been rejected and only 
k (plus all following draws) is left, v1 is the respective return 
for draw 1. 
Theorem: 
then 
Proof: 
00 00 
00 00 
Vk = -~ + ~max (V ,x) dF (x) 
From (A.2): Vk-Vl = c 1-'i, from the condition: Vk>v 1 
The conclusion of the theorem can be rewritten as: 
co 00 
vk1-vlk = -~+~max(V1 ,x)dF(x) + c1-£max(Vk,x)dF(x) 
V1 Vk 
Using (A.3): vkl-vlk = vk-vl + )VldF(x) + fxdF(x) 
o V1 
(A .1) 
(A. 2) 
(A. 3) 
Vk 
If we add and subtract fv v1 1 
dF(x) at the right hand side, some 
basic transformations yield: 
(A. 4) 
Since both elements at the right hand side of (A.4) are positive, 
their sum has to be positive as well. This proves the theorem. 
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